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procedure for the multistage representation of Harsanyi and Selten. Acting independently and without prior communication, the bargainers submit price offers. If these offers are compatible (in a sense to be defined later), a transaction is concluded at a price that depends on the offers; if they are not, then no transaction takes place. Though abstracting from the dynamics of the negotiation process, the single stage bargaining procedure emphasizes the basic strategy trade-off faced by each player. By making a more aggressive price offer, a player earns a greater profit in the event of an agreement but, at the same time, increases the risk of a disagreement (i.e. that his offer is unacceptable to the other).
Second, our approach employs continuous distributions to summarize the probability beliefs of the bargainers whereas Hansanyi and Selten focus on discrete distributions. Our aim is to investigate player bargaining strategies-that is, the mapping between the continuum of possible values that a player might hold and its price offers. The use of continuous distributions allows us to characterize a class of equilibria in which these bargaining strategies are well-behaved (i.e. differentiable). Additionally, the assumption facilitates the presentation of comparative statics results for specific examples.
Recently, a number of authors (Rosenthal [1978] , Myerson [1979] , and Myerson and Satterthwaite [1981] have examined the performance of arbitration procedures in the bargaining context. While our model offers predictions about the frequency of negotiation breakdown, bargaining efficiency, and relative bargaining advantage, our emphasis is on individual bargaining strategy and not on arbitration performance.
THE BASIC MODEL
Our analysis investigates bargaining behavior in the well-known case of bilateral monopoly. Suppose that a single seller of an indivisible good faces a single potential buyer. A successful bargain is concluded if and only if the good is transferred at a mutually acceptable price. Let us denote the seller's reservation price-the smallest monetary sum he will accept in exchange for the good (independent of his level of income). Similarly, let Ub denote the buyer's reservation price (the greatest sum he is willing to pay for the good). Since a bargain is struck only when it is agreeable to both parties, the sale price P must satisfy us < P c Ub if such an interval exists.
Incomplete information of the bargainers is modeled by the following assumption: Each party knows his own reservation price, but is uncertain about his adversary's, assessing a subjective probability distribution over the range of possible values that his opponent might hold. Specifically, the buyer regards us as a random variable possessing a cumulative distribution function Fb(vu) Aumann [1976] -that is, each side knows these distributions, knows that they are known by the other side, knows that the latter knowledge is known, and so forth.
In this framework, bargaining behavior depends on a player's reservation price vi, his assessment of the opponent's reservation price, Fi(vj), and the knowledge of the opponent's assessment, Fj(vi), for i = s, b.
We will consider the following simple bargaining procedure: Bargaining Rule. Seller and buyer submit sealed offers, s and b respectively. If b > s, a bargain is enacted and the good is sold at price, P = kb + (1 -k)s, where 0 c k c 1. If b < s, there is no sale and no money trades hands.
Special cases of this rule are of some interest. When k equals 1, the rule is equivalent to granting the buyer the right to make a first and final offer that the seller can accept or reject. In this instance, the sale price is determined solely by the buyer's offer, while the seller's offer serves only to determine whether there is an agreement or not. The seller's optimal strategy is to submit offers s = us for all us (i.e. his reservation price), and an agreement is reached if and only if b > s. Similarly, setting k = 0 effectively grants the seller the first-offer right. Finally, when k = 1/2, the rule determines a final sale price by splitting the difference between the player offers. Both offers carry equal weight in determining the sale price.
Framing the single stage bargain as a noncooperative game, we will characterize the resulting Nash or Bayesian equilibrium solutions. In the event of an agreement, each player earns a profit measured by the difference between the agreed price and his reservation price (P -us for the seller and Vb-P for the buyer); in the event of no agreement, each earns a zero profit. Additionally, we assume that each bargainer makes offers to maximize his expected profit. The notation b = B(vb) and s = S(vu) indicates that the players' price offers depend on their respective reservation prices. The functions B( ) and So ) will be referred to as the player offer strategies. Then, the expected profit of the buyer is given by 
PROPERTIES OF EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES
This section presents a number of results characterizing the equilibrium offer strategies of the bargaining game. Offer strategies satisfying S(V,) > Vb and B(vb) < v, for all v, and Vb constitute a no trade equilibrium. Obviously, these offer strategies are not very interesting. The results in this section describe equilibria in which an agreement occurs with a positive probability.
A fundamental property of equilibrium offer strategies for which trades occur is that they are increasing in the individual reservation prices. The higher the value placed on the good by the seller (buyer), the higher the price he demands (offers). The proof of this result requires no special assumptions about the offer strategies (e.g. continuity or differentiability). were smaller than b, a buyer holding Ub could lower his offer to b' and increase his profit in the event of a bargain without affecting the probability of a bargain. This would imply that b' and not b was optimal for Vb-a contradiction. This illustrates the basic principle that a player should never place an offer in an interval where the other player makes no offer. Our principal objective is to characterize the class of equilibria for which player offer strategies are well-behaved. We shall consider the family A of equilibria for which the following assumption is met: Each offer strategy is bounded above and below and is strictly increasing and differentiable except possibly at these offer bounds. Theorems 2 and 3 that follow characterize class A equilibria. Then by employing the dummy variable x = B '(s) and making the appropriate substitutions, we arrive at (3b).
Equations 3a and 3b are "linked" differential equations indicating that the player strategies are interdependent. The equations are a precise expression of the fact that a player's optimal price offer depends not only on vi and Fi(vj), but also indirectly on Fj(vi) since the latter influences the opponent's strategy.
We can now characterize the equilibrium strategies at the offer bounds. For reference purposes, we denote the solutions to (3a) and (3b) over an unrestricted range of reservation prices by S( ) and B( ) respectively. We denote the corresponding inverse functions similarly. Since these functions are strictly increasing, the maximum and minimum price offers are S(v&) and S(L) for the seller and B(vb) and B(vb) for the buyer.
To Differentiating this expression with respect to s yields precisely the first order condition of Theorem 2.
Similarly, in the case that B(vb) < S(s), a bargain is impossible for sufficiently low buyer reservation prices. For lower and lower buyer values, the probability of a bargain first goes to zero at Vb = S(8s). (At a reservation price greater than this, it is suboptimal for the buyer to match the lowest seller offer since by bidding instead in the interval (S(V8), Vb), he can earn a positive profit. Thus, the buyer makes the truthful offer B(vb) = Vb only at Vb =9S(L).) For Vb < S(v8), the buyer's precise offer strategy is largely irrelevant since in equilibrium no bargain will ever be concluded. A buyer with Vb in this range faces only one restriction-that his offer be smaller than B(vb) in order to preserve the zero profit equilibrium. If this restriction failed to hold, the buyer would earn negative expected profits against the seller's best response.
In sum, the pair S( ) and B( ) of Theorem 2 describe class A equilibria except at boundary conditions that occur as follows: k) )o, using the results in part a. To put this another way, the probability of a successful bargain would be 1/2 if both parties made truthful offers (since F8 = Fb). The maximum attainable probability when optimal offer strategies are used is 9/32. Similarly, expected group profit under truthful offers is 1/6; under the equilibrium strategies it is at most /64.
One conclusion of Example I is that one's intuitive notion of who gains from different kinds of compromises can be mistaken. Suppose that the bargaining rule is k 1/2. A suggestion is made to change the rule to k = ,/4 so that the sale price is determined according to P = (3/4)b + (1/4)s. In whose interest, buyer or seller, is such a change? It would appear at first blush that this change benefits the seller and harms the buyer. Since a sale is made only when there is some "bargaining space" between the two offers (i.e., when b -s ! 0), the move would seem to signify a surrender of this space by the buyer. Should not the switch signify an increase in profit for the seller and a reduction for the buyer?
The answer is no. The fallacy of this line of reasoning is that it implicitly assumes that the bargaining strategies are unaffected by the rule change. It is true that the seller would gain and the buyer would lose if the strategies employed for k = 1/2 were continued to be used for k = 3/4. This is not the case, however, as the formulas of Example 1 demonstrate. When k increases, both the buyer and the seller shade their offers, the seller moving closer to his reservation price, the buyer toward a greater understatement. The net result is to confer an advantage on the buyer.
In Example 1, the bargain is identical (F, = Fb) and, furthermore, the probability distribution is symmetric. In this instance, the bargaining rule that calls for splitting the difference (k = 1/2) has a natural appeal. It is efficient (i.e., it maximizes expected group profit), and it treats the parties symmetrically. In fact, Myerson and Satterthwaite show that the split-the-difference bargaining rule is an optimal mechanism-that is, it attains the greatest group expected profit of all possible bargaining procedures. For these reasons splitting the difference between offers is attractive for bargains that are identical and symmetric.
The next example characterizes the equilibrium strategies for nonidentical bargains when the buyer and seller distributions are uniform. In the case of differing degrees of risk aversion, one can show that, other things equal, an increase in the risk aversion of the seller (buyer) implies uniformly lower (higher) offers by both parties in equilibrium. Not surprisingly, the opponent's best response to more truthful bids by the player who has become more risk averse is to make more aggressive offers himself.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In what respects do the equilibria described in Theorems 2 and 3 provide an accurate representation of bargaining under uncertainty? Since the conclusions of any model depend on its premises, it is well to examine the extent to which the model's assumptions capture or approx-imate the actual bargaining conditions. First, uncertainty concerning the opponent's walk away price is frequently encountered in bargaining situations. It is the task of each bargainer to assess the likely reservation price of his opponent. Indeed, the better the bargainer's information about his opponent, the better he can expect to fare in the negotiations. For instance, the man on the street is better equipped to bargain with a car dealer if he possesses the "book" that lists the prices the dealer himself has paid for various models and if he has assessed the current state of demand for automobiles.
Probability assessment becomes more complicated in an environment with stochastic dependence between the player values. For instance, suppose that each bargainer's value for the good depends on future (unknown) market conditions as well as on his personal characteristics. Additionally, suppose that each bargainer possesses differential information bearing on the good's potential value. Then, based on this information, each player must estimate his opponent's value and his own value in the event there is an agreement or not. In particular, the fact that the players would conclude an agreement (or not) is informative of the good's ultimate value.
While the single-stage bargaining rule fails to capture the pattern of reciprocal concessions observed in everyday practice, it is a useful idealization and a starting point for other investigations. A more general model would allow the bargainers multiple rounds in which to exchange offers (potentially incurrng "transaction" costs in the process). To the extent that the exchange of offers conveys information about the reservation prices, one would expect agreements to become more frequent. For example, when a bargain is unsuccessful at the initial stage, each party could revise his probability assessment of the other's reservation price and could make a concession in his next offer. These kinds of multistage bargains can be properly analyzed within our framework and deserve further attention. (For an example, see Sobel and Takahashi [1980] .)
In our view, there are strong arguments for the monotonic equilibria of Theorems 2 and 3 even when other equilibria may exist. An individual is likely to accept the following proposition as reasonable: "The higher the seller's value the more he demands for the good; the higher the buyer's value the more he is willing to offer." Accepting this principle and believing firmly that any bargaining opponent will accept it as well, the individual then seeks a best monotonic offer strategy.
Monotonic offer strategies may also provide a focal point for the bargaining process. As a simple example, suppose the buyer's reservation price is uniformly distributed on the interval [0.5, 1] and the seller's price is similarly distributed on the interval [0, 0.5]. In this case, the constant offers S(v,) = B(vb) = 0.5 constitute an equilibrium and guar-antee that the players always concluded a bargain. Each party chooses not to push further its demand, nor to retreat, expecting his opponent to feel the same way. One must not overlook, however, the existence of a second equilibrium in monotonic strategies. In this case, both parties make offers that are smaller than 0.5 for sufficiently low reservation prices and offers greater than 0.5 for high prices. Thus, it is prudent for a buyer who values the good highly to make a generous offer, thereby increasing the likelihood of an agreement when facing a seller who may not cooperate with an offer of S(v,) = 0.5.
Equilibrium theory can furnish no definitive conclusion indicating which outcome represents the "more logical" bargaining focal -point. Observe, however, that the monotonic equilibrium is responsive to changes in the underlying distributions FS and Fb, while the constant strategy equilibrium is not. If, for instance, the buyer's value is drawn uniformly from the interval [0.5, 5] instead of [0.5, 11, the constant strategy equilibrium S(v,) = B(vb) = 0.5 becomes much less compelling. Is this a logical resting point-a position from which neither player expects the other to retreat? It would seem that the buyer could be expected to concede (settling for a smaller but still substantial profit) if the seller insisted. The monotonic equilibrium is free from these criticisms since it depends explicitly on the underlying distributions. With the shift in possible buyer values, the offers of the buyer become more generous and those of the seller more demanding. This response is consistent with the expectation that such a shift should benefit both parties (not just the buyer).
Finally, when Us> Q b, there is no guarantee that a mutually beneficial agreement is always available. In this case of a "close" bargain, there is no constant strategy equilibrium. Indeed, the case of an identical bargain F, = Fb points out the main difficulty with a constant offer strategy. The employment of an aggressive offer will likely preclude an agreement, while an offer making too great a concession will be unprofitable. In short, players will adopt monotonic strategies because they are more efficient.
We would argue that close bargains occur most frequently in actual practice. In most bargaining situations, the opportunity for the seller or the buyer to cease negotiations and to consider a third-party transaction is available, at least implicitly. It is unusual for the buyer to be the only potential customer for the good or for the seller to have a monopoly position. In this instance, each party's reservation price will reflect, at least partially, the price (net of search transaction costs) that he could expect to obtain elsewhere. To the extent to which beliefs about the prices available from third parties transactions differ, or access to these parties differs, the reservation prices of the buyer and seller will diverge. Nevertheless, one would expect such an opportunity to minimize the gap between the possible reservation prices of the parties. This suggests that close bargains may be of the greatest practical importance.
